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  • Privatizing Police Powers

    Below is the thesis I wrote on security officers with police powers. I am posting it here to hopefully generate some meaningful conversation.

    UNDERSTANDING THE POWERS AND DUTIES TO ACT AND ARREST
    [Private Security Officers With Police Powers]

    "Arrest" means the taking of a person into custody, see for example section 556.061(7) of the Missouri Revised Statutes (2006) which states “Custody", a person is in custody when the person has been arrested but has not been delivered to a place of confinement.” An arrest may be effected by either an “actual restraint of the person or by his or her submission to custody.”

    However, “stopping and making reasonable inquiries” of a person reasonably suspected of criminal activity does not constitute an arrest. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). It is rather, merely an investigative process to establish probable cause.

    Therefore, an “arrest” may be better defined by “the taking of another into custody for the actual or purported purpose of bringing the other before a court, body or official, or of otherwise securing the administration of the law.” See Perkins, Elements of Police Science 223, 227 (1942).

    Neither private security officers nor the employers have qualified immunity, which shields another, who acts under color of law from legal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § 242. See Richardson et al v. McKnight 521 U.S. 399 (1997), (U.S. Supreme Court reversed its prior ruling in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) that extended qualified immunity to private citizens acting under color of law or were state actors).

    Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.” Title 18 U.S.C. § 242 is the sister to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and imposes criminal liability.

    Determining whether or not a private security officer acts under color of law, is done on a three-prong test.

    The first prong is the public function test, which is determined by examining the duties and functions of security officers and the governing force, to ascertain whether or not the duties and functions serve a public function. See Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian, 184 F.3d 623, 627-30 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that where private security guards are endowed by law with plenary police powers such that they are de facto police officers, they may qualify as state actors under the public function test). See also Rodriguez v. Smithfield Packing Co., Inc., 338 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (observing that “the police function is ‘one of the most basic functions of government’” and “an arrest is ‘the function most commonly associated with the police’”) (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978)).

    The second prong is the state compulsion test, which is determined by the existence of a statute, rule, regulation or order to compel, counsel, direct, encourage or control the conduct of a private security officer. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970).

    The third prong is the symbiotic relationship or nexus test, which is determined by the presence of ones conduct serving or having the appearance of serving the ends of government in protecting public safety by fighting crime so as to bring into focus federal questions of law. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961).

  • #2
    For purposes of the remaining part of this thesis, the focus will be that of examining Title 17 of the Missouri Code of State Regulations, Section 10-2.010(3) which states, in pertinent part that ” Those licensed to perform private security services have police powers. . .” and Section 10-2.030(1)(A) which states in pertinent part that “Class A licenses shall have the authority to detain or apprehend suspects either committing felonies, misdemeanors, or city ordinance violations in the presence of the licensee or during the attempt to commit the same or upon probable cause to believe an offense was committed. . .”

    The State of Missouri defines a police officer to be: “A member of “police” which is an organized civil force for maintaining order, preventing and detecting crime, and enforcing laws, the body of men by which municipal laws and regulations of the city, town, or district are enforced.” See American Federation of Teachers, Local 691 v. The School District of Kansas City, Missouri Public Case No. 99 (Mo. State Board of Mediation 1999) (citing Burke v. State 47 S.E.2d 116 (1948) (the Board rejected the City of Kansas City, Missouri argument that school district security officer’s are police officers, because school district security officer’s do not carry a firearm and do not have the authority to enforce laws by means of arrest powers]. Thereby demonstrating that security officers with a Class A license, who carry firearms and have arrest powers, are, in fact, “members of the police force.”

    In 1985, the Missouri Supreme Court defined a “law enforcement officer” to “encompass those persons engaged in law enforcement, who, regardless of job title, perform duties and functions substantially comparable to those performed by police and deputy sheriffs.” See Jackson County v. Missouri State Board of Mediation, 690 S.W.2d 400, 402-03 (Mo. banc 1985). Thereby including private security officers with police powers and because of such, private security officers with a Class A license are precluded from joining a union pursuant to 105.510 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, even though they are “at will employees” and would otherwise enjoy this right, liberty, privilege and / or security under the Missouri Doctrine of Public Policy, if not for being a law enforcement officer.

    In 1999 and again in 2000, the City of Kansas City argued before the Missouri State Board of Mediation, against individuals holding a Class A private security officer license, being permitted to join a union on the premise that these individuals are “police officers” within the meaning of section 105.510 of the Missouri Revised Statutes and are therefore, prohibited by statutory law, from having this right. To-wit, the Assistant Legal Advisor to the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department, Dale Close, specifically argued that “person’s holding private security officer licenses are vested with police powers to supplement the Kansas City Police Department’s overall effort to fight crime.” See Kansas City Firefighters, Local 42 v. City of Kansas City Public Case No. R 2000-046 (Mo. State Board of Mediation 2000). As a result, the City of Kansas City, Missouri knowingly and purposefully established a clear and decisive mandate, in the execution of ones official duties and functions under his or her Class A private security officer license pursuant to Title 17 of the Missouri Code of State Regulations, Section 10-2 et seq (1999).

    In 1999, Title 17 of the Missouri Code of State Regulations, Section 10-2 was amended and expanded the legal framework, those with a Class A private security officer license operate, to include the legal authority to exercise “police powers” [see 17 CSR, Sec., 10-2.010(3)] and “arrest powers” [see 17 CSR, Sec., 10-2.030(1)(A)] against those committing felonies, misdemeanors and city ordinance violations of law. See Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109-10 (1945) (holding “one has the power to arrest when one is “clothed with the authority of state law”).

    Comment


    • #3
      Furthermore, the amendment also imposed an important substantive predicate, in Section 10-2.030(1)(A), by and through the words of “shall have the authority to detain or apprehend”, to knowingly and purposefully constrain the decision making authority of others, including employers, to obstruct or preclude the ability of private security officers to exercise their police powers, under color of law, in a light most favorable to the City of Kansas City, Missouri and the State of Missouri, as a means to further the ends of government in protecting public safety by fighting crime. See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (finding discretion to be constrained by “substantive predicates").

      Therefore, when examining sections 10-2.010(1) and 10-2.030(1)(A) of Title 17 CSR, we can clearly see the existence of all three prongs (public function test; state compulsion test, and the symbolic relationship or nexus test) and thus, private security officer’s, with a Class A license, operate under color of law, and thus, both private security officers and their employers are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § 242. See Richardson et al v. McKnight 521 U.S. 399 (1997).

      The public function test is fulfilled by private security officers, with a Class A license being given “police powers” specifically to further the ends of government in protecting public safety by fighting crime. See Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian, 184 F.3d 623, 627-30 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Kansas City Firefighters, Local 42 v. City of Kansas City Public Case No. R 2000-046 (Mo. State Board of Mediation 2000).

      The state compulsion test is fulfilled by (1) the clear and decisive mandate that “person’s holding private security officer licenses are vested with police powers to supplement the Kansas City Police Department’s overall effort to fight crime.” See Kansas City Firefighters, Local 42 v. City of Kansas City. And (2) the substantive predicate imposed, in Title 17 of the Missouri Code of State Regulations, Section 10-2.030(1)(A) (1999), by and through the words of “shall have the authority to detain or apprehend. . .” to constrain the decision making authority of others to obstruct or preclude private security officers, with a Class A license, from the ability to exercise their legal authority in a light most favorable to the ends of government in protecting public safety by fighting crime.

      The symbolic relationship or nexus test is fulfilled by the overt fact that the conduct of private security officers is controlled, directed, counseled or encouraged by the State or its’ political subdivision(s) through Title 17 CSR, Sec., 10-2 et seq (1999), and the mandate, declared by Dale Close, in Kansas City Firefighters, Local 42 v. City of Kansas City, to-wit, have the intent or effect to achieve a particular end, in government functions, and therein compels private security officers to abide by the Constitutional mandates when contacting or arresting a suspect for alleged criminal activity. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961) (holding that “private conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause unless to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been found to have become involved in it).

      It is also important to point out that both the substantive predicate found in section 10-2.030(1)(A) of Title 17 of the Mo. Code of State Regulations, and the clear mandate declared by Dale Close, in Kansas City Firefighters, Local 42 v. City of Kansas City, place upon private security officers, with a Class A license, a Duty to Act, which inherently often transfers into a Duty to Arrest, in order for the private security officer and their employer to avert purposefully, knowingly, recklessly or negligently committing criminal acts, for example. Section 575.030.1of the Missouri Revised Statues (2006) states “A person commits the crime of hindering prosecution if for the purpose of preventing the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for conduct constituting a crime he: Subsection (2) “Prevents or obstructs, by means of force, deception or intimidation, anyone from performing an act that might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person.”

      One example of this is an employer who threatens to or actually: (1) terminates the security officer from employment; (2) gives the security officer a poor work performance evaluation; (3) reassigns the security officer to another post, (4) denies a raise or promotion, (5) creates a hostile working environment, or (6) takes any other adverse tangible employment action(s) against the security officer, as a means to prevent or obstruct the security officer from performing his or her official duties and mandates under Title 17, or that which has the effect of

      Comment


      • #4
        adversely punishing the security officer because the security officer performed his or her official duties and mandates under Title 17. See Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004);Yow v. Village of Eolia, 859 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993) (failure to have an individual prosecuted for sale and possession of drugs). See also Faust v. Ryder Commercial Leasing & Servs., 954 S.W.2d 383 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997).

        Likewise, an example of a security officer committing a criminal act, in consideration for or receipt of (1) retaining employment; (2) receiving a favorable work performance evaluation, raise or promotion, or (3) avoiding any other adverse tangible employment action, is by his or her purposefully, knowingly, recklessly or negligently failing or refusing to abide by his or her duty to act and exercising their powers within that duty. Section 575.020.1 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (2006), states that “A person commits the crime of concealing an offense if“: Subsection (2) “He accepts or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit or other consideration in consideration of his concealing any offense, [refraining from initiating] or aiding in the prosecution of an offense, or withholding any evidence thereof” (internal brackets added).

        Hence, under the Doctrine of Pari Materia , the substantial predicate found by and through the words of “shall have the authority to. . .” in Title 17 CSR, Sec., 10-2.030(1)(A) (1999), correlates to the legislative intents found in such state statutes as but not limited to: 562.016 RSMo, 575.010(2) RSMo, 575.020(4) RSMo, 575.180.1(2) RSMo, 575.230.1(2) RSMo, 576.010.1(2) RSMo, and / or 576.020.1(2) RSMo (2006), to ensure the interests of the City of Kansas City, Missouri and the State of Missouri are carried out in fighting crime, by security officers performing their official duties and functions found in the public function test and the state compulsion test.

        The Doctrine of Pari Materia requires that statutes relating to the same subject matter be construed together even though they are found in different chapters or were enacted at different times. When one statute deals with a subject in general terms and another statute deals with the same subject in a more specific way, the two statutes should be harmonized if possible. If the statutes cannot be reconciled, the more specific prevails over the more general. See Dupont v. Mills, Del., 196 A.168, 9 W.W.Harr. 42, 119 A.L.R. 174 (The purpose of "pari materia" rule is to ascertain and to carry into effect the Legislature's intention). See also Derossett v. Alton and Southern Ry. Co., 850 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Mo.App. E.D 1993) (Missouri courts recognize doctrine of "pari materia," a rule of construction wherein statutes relating to same subject matter are considered together).

        Privatizing police powers into the hands of private security officers has fast become the norm in governmental efforts to protect public safety in the face of depleting manpower and financial resources. See "Sourcewatch: Company police agencies" (http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php...olice_agencies); "San Francisco Chronicle: More security firms getting police powers - January 2007” (http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/articl...GVENCASV1.DTL; see also "Assistant Chief Joseph Lyons, Stuart Police Department, Florida: Privatization of Police Services" (http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/fcjei/SL...ers/Lyons.pdf; see also “Private police violence and the scope of Section 1983,” By Lynne Wilson (http://www.nlg-npap.org/html/researc...vatepolice.pfd).

        In doing so, State legislators have sparked a national debate, in part, because of the monumental constitutional issues existing, in and of itself, but also due to private security officers abusing their powers when confronting those suspected of committing crimes. See Ridge v. Metropolitan Patrol, Inc., No. 0616-CV30330 (Jackson County, Mo. Cir. Ct. 2006) (physical brutality against a private citizen); see also Gerle et al v. Sunset Security et al No. 01CV217626 (Jackson County, Mo. Cir. Ct. 2001) (wrongful death of a private citizen). See also Debbie Meszaros et al v. KCPI Security, Inc., et al No. 0516-CV12683 (Jackson County, Mo Cir. Ct. 2005) (wrongful death suit); see also United States. v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), wherein the Court held that "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken `under color of' state law." Id. at 326; accord Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).

        Comment


        • #5
          Likewise, we also create enormous conflicts of interest when privatizing police powers because the majority of employers are focused on financial profits, rather than security officer competence and law abiding actions and the result often requires or permits criminal acts to occur. See Yale Law Journal, Vol. 102, No. 8, Symposium: Economic Competitiveness and the Law (Jun., 1993), pp. 2231-2257 doi:10.2307/796865, (the Model Penal Code, which was adopted by the American Law Institute, in 1962, and revised in 1985, distinguishes between four levels of criminally culpable means rea: purposeful; knowing; reckless; and negligent). See Cross v. North Kansas City Security Patrol Service, et al No. 07-0226 (U.S. Dist. Ct. for Mo. W.D. 2007) (arguing, among other claims that security officers operated without the mandated licensures in the State of Kansas and Missouri). See also Orion Security, Inc., v. Board of Police Commissioners No. WD61195 (Mo.App. W.D. 2002) (Appeal Court affirms suspension of license for violations of 84.720 RSMo in security officers operating without a license).

          Thus, while Courts must consider the governmental interest in efficiently and effectively providing public services, see Barnard v. Jackson County, Mo. 43 F.3d 1218, 1223-24 (8th Cir. 1995) even if such is to be accomplished by privatizing police powers. We must be mindful and certainly exceptionally careful to ensure that those private security officers who have police powers and exercise such, are well trained and educated in these powers. Leastwise, we only effectively create a militia which has no meaningful purpose other than to engage in vigilantly operations for financial and other profits; under the cloak of such being a legitimate government function.


          Christopher Cross, M.A.
          Criminologist
          Kansas City, Missouri Commissioned Private Security Officer, (Class A armed license)
          April 2007

          Comment


          • #6
            The biggest difference between private security and law enforcement (outside the powers of arrest discussion) is the governing organization. For the police, its the local or state government. For the security officer, its their employer.

            The executive branch of government has the responsibility to maintain public order and enforce the laws created by the legislature. The police officer is the part of the executive branch that executes that responsiblity. If they make a mistake, they are held accountable by the government and the people who elected its officials.

            Private security companies only answer to their owners or shareholders, not the public. In essence, they have different masters and motivations for their actions. The police act under the blanket of the "public good." The security officer acts for the "private good."

            Law enforcement is the only profession in the country with the unique ability to temporarily take away your freedom (i.e. they can arrest you). In the eyes of the public, this is an enormous amount of power and responsibility. For that very reason, a private company should never be allowed to have that much power.

            Just my opinion,
            C. Adams, BCJ, MBA, PhD-candidate
            Police Sergeant

            Comment


            • #7
              I agree but disagree as well

              As I point out, there are numerous conflicts of interest involved and becuase of this, one has to be exceptionally careful when dispensing out police powers for others to use. Hence, while I find such powers to be useful to me and certainly a tool in protecting my life and safety, as a front line officer. I also know that in the wrong hands it is a profound weapon that imposes very serious and far reaching consequences into the lives of others.

              More and more states are turning to this way of effeciently and effectively protecting public safety; 30 states have such laws, yet, only 19 have also enacted laws to closely regulate the private security industry.

              Christopher

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by cblackthorne
                The biggest difference between private security and law enforcement (outside the powers of arrest discussion) is the governing organization. For the police, its the local or state government. For the security officer, its their employer.

                The executive branch of government has the responsibility to maintain public order and enforce the laws created by the legislature. The police officer is the part of the executive branch that executes that responsiblity. If they make a mistake, they are held accountable by the government and the people who elected its officials.

                Private security companies only answer to their owners or shareholders, not the public. In essence, they have different masters and motivations for their actions. The police act under the blanket of the "public good." The security officer acts for the "private good."

                Law enforcement is the only profession in the country with the unique ability to temporarily take away your freedom (i.e. they can arrest you). In the eyes of the public, this is an enormous amount of power and responsibility. For that very reason, a private company should never be allowed to have that much power.

                Just my opinion,
                C. Adams, BCJ, MBA, PhD-candidate
                Police Sergeant
                Some private companies already do though.

                You're leaving entities such as railroad police out of that equation. Their governing entity is ultimately a private business, yet they have powers of arrest as well.
                "First of all, then we have to say the American public overwhelmingly voted for socialism when they elected President Obama." - Al Sharpton, March 21, 2010

                Comment


                • #9
                  Likewise, here in Kansas City, Missouri, the Air Port Police are actually licensed as private security officers with a Class A license. It is only through the Memorandum of Understanding between the Kansas City Police Department and the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners that permits them to operate as an actual police department with broader authority than private security law enforcement officers with police powers under a Class A license.

                  On a separate note, I met with two senior ranking police officials in the Kansas City Police Department, this moring. We are beginning to build a new program for security officers that will incorporate them into first line responses involving homeland security issues. This program will be the first of its' kind in the U.S. and shows promise in getting security officers trained better than currently exists.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Im only expressing my opinion, but I feel very uncomfortable with giving private security arrest powers.

                    Its not the training or the professionalism. I feel good security companies have plenty of both. When I was in college I worked as an armed security patrol officer for several years.

                    For me the big issue is accountability. An organization has different goals and objectives when its serving the public than when its serving its shareholders.

                    A police officer takes an oath to protect the public. A security officer has no such oath and his loyalties are to the company (as they should be as an employee).

                    Regards,
                    C

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by cblackthorne
                      The biggest difference between private security and law enforcement (outside the powers of arrest discussion) is the governing organization. For the police, its the local or state government. For the security officer, its their employer.

                      The executive branch of government has the responsibility to maintain public order and enforce the laws created by the legislature. The police officer is the part of the executive branch that executes that responsiblity. If they make a mistake, they are held accountable by the government and the people who elected its officials.

                      Private security companies only answer to their owners or shareholders, not the public. In essence, they have different masters and motivations for their actions. The police act under the blanket of the "public good." The security officer acts for the "private good."

                      Law enforcement is the only profession in the country with the unique ability to temporarily take away your freedom (i.e. they can arrest you). In the eyes of the public, this is an enormous amount of power and responsibility. For that very reason, a private company should never be allowed to have that much power.

                      Just my opinion,
                      C. Adams, BCJ, MBA, PhD-candidate
                      Police Sergeant
                      but i do believe railroad police, and ' specials' from san francisco
                      have been around a long time, and in north carolina, wachenhut operates
                      private police for schools and hospitals, not saying they are good, bad or indifferent.....
                      " if you talk in your sleep, don't mention my name....
                      " if you walk in your sleep, forget where you came....

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by cblackthorne
                        For me the big issue is accountability. An organization has different goals and objectives when its serving the public than when its serving its shareholders.

                        A police officer takes an oath to protect the public. A security officer has no such oath and his loyalties are to the company (as they should be as an employee).

                        C
                        Yes, "accountability" is certainly an issue and one that I constantly harp on because too many compainies and security officers are not being held properly accountable. Many - far too many employers want "stupid guards" because they are easier to control and force into committing criminal acts; taking all the liability, for the employer - the more criminal acts committed the higher the profit margin goes up - generally by such acts as concealing an offense by not acting in accordance with ones legal duties to act.

                        I am currently litigating a case in the federal court [see Cross v. North Kansas City Security Patrol Service et al] which is taking on the issue of "accountability" and the oversight the Board of Police Commissioners is supposed to be taking.

                        In my meeting yesterday, I expressed my views that employers should be sending the Board notices when they terminate security officers; to ensure the Board is reviewing such and taking proactive efforts to get rid of security officers whose conduct violates Title 17. This is not being done and hence, my federal suit addresses this issue for the Courts ruling.

                        Last night, I took 3 males down with my gun drawn, who were suspected of being involved in a reported shooting - a short time after I cleared this scene, I then assisted the police in taking down 2 more males also suspected in being involved in the reported shooting.

                        I suppose I could have just sat there; turning blind eyes and do nothing, as most employers undoubtedly would prefer - but I believe that sometimes, the best way to achieving "accountability" is by security officers having the courage to stand up for what is right and acting in accordance with their duty to act, rather than running to save their own butts in the eyes of their employers.

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by pp48n
                          Remember RoboCop. I think that clearly spells out many of the fears assoiciated with privatizing a police force.
                          You are absolutely correct in your assessment insofar as there is legitimate need to be exceptionally careful when authorizing private companies to exercise such powers over the people.

                          However, merely because a police officer is a "sworn peace officer" by no means equates to an automatic inability to be and act in corrupt ways.

                          Qualified immunity was established to intentionally sheild police and other government officials from legal accountability by the public; especially by those who are harmed in some way. In effect, qualified immunity is the framework by which a great deal of governmental corruption exists because it deliberately stips the necessary checks and balances away.

                          I might add here that the U.S. Supreme Court took away the private citizen right to qualified immunity when acting under color of law. By doing this, the Court places security officers and security companies in a position of being held "more accountable" for ones actions than government officials are being held for the same exact conduct that violates the law.

                          Thus, in theory, this factor should serve in the publics ability to keep private companies and private security officers in check, and it is the duty of every licensing Board to proactively participate in keeping both security companies and security officers in check as well. Something that they are greatly failing or refusing to do, across the board.
                          Last edited by Christopherstjo; 04-06-2007, 01:10 PM.

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by Christopherstjo
                            Likewise, here in Kansas City, Missouri, the Air Port Police are actually licensed as private security officers with a Class A license. It is only through the Memorandum of Understanding between the Kansas City Police Department and the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners that permits them to operate as an actual police department with broader authority than private security law enforcement officers with police powers under a Class A license.
                            All those KCI Officers have completed at least a 600 hour State of Missouri Police Academy....most of them have at least 800 hour academies either from KCPD, Western Missouri or Missouri Western........

                            How much training do you and/or your co-workers have....?

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by Bearcat357
                              All those KCI Officers have completed at least a 600 hour State of Missouri Police Academy....most of them have at least 800 hour academies either from KCPD, Western Missouri or Missouri Western........

                              How much training do you and/or your co-workers have....?
                              Are you missing something in the translation in what has been written? Nobody is denying that the vast majority of security officers are not trained properly - this has been said several times and that is the point when contemplating upon states enacting laws to give security officers police powers without also mandating that they be properly trained. But you would be amazed at just how resistant others are to open doors for security officers to be trained and they keep these doors closed for a specific reason.

                              Comment

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